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Baker: Product Liability Suits and the Stream of Commerce after ASAHI: W

PRODUCT LIABILITY SUITS AND THE STREAM
OF COMMERCE AFTER ASAHI: WORLD-WIDE
VOLKSWAGEN IS STILL THE ANSWER
I. INTRODUCTION

Beginning in 1980, the United States Supreme Court applied the 'stream of
commerce' analysis to decide a personal jurisdiction case involving a non-resident
defendant in a products liability suit, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson.' The
stream of commerce theory developed in product liability cases because a
manufacturer usually only comes into direct contact with the forum state through
intermediaries such as retailers or distributors.' A state can still exert personal
jurisdiction over a manufacturer who delivers its products into the stream of
commerce without offending Due Process if the 'stream of commerce' analysis is
satisfied
Under the World-Wide Volkswagen standard, it is not unreasonable to subject
a manufacturer to suit in the forum state "if the sale of a product... arises from the
efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market
for its product in other states." 4 The Supreme Court then employed the stream of
commerce analysis in 1987 to decide Asahi Metal Industries v. Superior Court,5
another products liability suit involving foreign parties.6 Asahi did not help to
clarify how much contact is needed to establish that the non-resident manufacturer
has directly or indirectly served the forum state in product liability suits as set forth
in World-Wide Volkswagen; it only helped to confuse the amount of contact
required before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction.7 Asahi further confused
the issue because the Court split into three groups over the amount of contact
required in the stream of commerce analysis for a defendant to establish a
purposeful contact in the forum state.' Justice O'Connor, joined by The Chief
Justice, Justice Powell, and Justice Scalia concluded that more than just placing the
product into the stream of commerce was required to establish a purposeful
contact.' Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice
Blackmun held that jurisdiction was reasonable as long as the defendant knew the
1. 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (refusing to allow Oklahoma to exercise personal jurisdiction over the non-resident
Volkswagen manufacturer under a stream of commerce analysis).

2. See Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assoc., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 1998).
3. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98.

4. Id. at 297.
5. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
6. Id. (refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant based on reasonableness factors without
clarifying the stream of commerce analysis). Id.
7. See Packerware Corp. v. B & R Plastics, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1079 (D. Kan. 1998).
8. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112, 116-17.
9. See id. at 112.
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product was being marketed in the forum state."t Justice Stevens issued his own
opinion that a purposeful contact analysis was not required in Asahi because
jurisdiction was overall unreasonable."' Today, the situation exists where the circuit
courts apply different stream of commerce analyses in similar product liability
suits.12 Many of the circuits simply apply the facts in the record to the minimum
contacts analyses outlined inAsahiby both Justice O'Connor and Justice Brennan. 3
A few of the circuits have held that World-Wide Volkswagen's precedent was not
overruled by a majority inAsahi; therefore, its standard is still the law. 4 While the
circuits explicitly applying World-Wide Volkswagen are in the minority, most all the
circuits are using the language of World-Wide Volkswagen in applying the stream
of commerce analysis leading to the conclusion that Asahi did not change the
standard for a purposeful contact in the stream of commerce analysis. 5
This comment discusses how Asahi did not change the stream of commerce
analysis because the majority of the circuit courts are still impliedly following the
analysis established in World-Wide Volkswagen through the use of its language in
analyzing the case facts under the stream of commerce test. Part II discusses the
Supreme Court decisions in World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi and the establishment of the stream of commerce analysis. Part Il describes the varied approaches
to the stream of commerce analysis adopted by the different circuit courts. Part IIIA
examines how many of the circuits are applying the facts in the record to all the
different analyses set forth in Asahi, yet using the World-Wide Volkswagen
language in defining the tests. Secondly, Part IIIB describes how two of the circuits
have reconciled World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi in applying the stream of
commerce test. Part IC sets forth the First Circuit's position of adopting Justice
O'Connor's analysis inAsahi. Lastly, the approach taken by the circuits explicitly
using the stream of commerce standard under World-Wide Volkswagen is discussed
in Part JlID. Part IV concludes the comment based on the overall approach taken
by the circuits that World-Wide Volkswagen's standard for the stream of commerce
analysis was not changed by Asahi in product liability suits.

10. See id. at 116-17.
11. See id. at 121-22.
12. Cf Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Collelli & Assoc., Inc., 149 F.3d 197,206-07 (3rd Cir. 1998) (avoiding stream
of commerce debate by satisfying the standards of both Asahi pluralities); Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co.,
35 F.3d 939,945 (4th Cir. 1994) (reconciling World-Wide Volkswagen andAsahi);Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate
Display Fireworks, 25 F.3d 610,613-14 (8th Cir. 1994) (following original streamof commerce test used in World-

Wide Volkswagen because it had not been overruled by a majority of the courts); Ruston Gas Turbines v. Corchran,
9 F.3d 415, 420 (5th Cir. 1993) (adopting Justice O'Connor's view that additional conduct is necessary for a
defendant to purposefully avail himself of the forum state); Tobin v. AstraPharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528,54243 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding that based on the facts of the specific case jurisdiction was reasonable under all
views outlined in Asahi); Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A. Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (11th Cir. 1993) (refusing to
choose specific test since facts satisfied all in Asahi. Court also noted those circuits choosing to simply follow
World-Wide Volkswagen); Boit v. Gar-tec Prods. Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 683 (Ist Cir. 1992) (adopting Justice
O'Connor's view that additional conduct is necessary for a defendant to purposefully avail himself of the forum
state); Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1992) (same).
13. See Pennzoil, 149 F.3d at 206-07; Tobin, 993 F.2d at 542-43; Vermeulen, 965 F.2d at 1026; Shute v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 382 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
14. See Barone, 25 F.3d at 613-14; Ruston, 9 F.3d at 420; Dehmlow, 963 F.2d at 947.
15. See discussion infraParts LA.1-3.
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I. WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN TO ASAHI, THE DEBATE OVER STREAM OF
COMMERCE

The Supreme Court used the stream of commerce theory in product liability
cases to address the growing interstate and international economy.1 6 Because a
product manufacturer usually does not come into direct contact with a state even
though its products are marketed in that state, the state needed a way to assert
jurisdiction over the manufacturer when its products were involved in lawsuits. 7
A state is able to assert jurisdiction over the manufacturer as long as a purposeful
contact is established through the stream of commerce. 8 In other words,
jurisdiction is reasonable as long as "a corporation delivers its products into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers
in the forum state."' 9 The stream of commerce analysis was first used by the
Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen.2" The analysis was later employed in
Asahi when the Supreme Court2 failed to re-define the amount of contact required
under the stream of commerce. '
A. World-Wide Volkswagen
The Supreme Court adopted the stream of commerce theory in 1980 when it
decided World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.22 For a forum state to exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant through the stream of commerce theory, the defendant's contacts with the state must be such "that he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there."' Jurisdiction over a non-resident manufacturer in a
products liability suit is reasonable when the sale of the product in the forum state
arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor "to serve directly or
indirectly, the market for its product" which has allegedly caused the injury at
issue. 24 In World-Wide Volkswagen the court ultimately denied jurisdiction over the
defendants because they had no activity in Oklahoma, therefore making it
unreasonable to subject the defendants to suit there.'
World-Wide Volkswagen involved a products liability suit by New York

16. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 294 (quoting its own language in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 250-51, the court stated "As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between the States,
the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in
communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome").
17. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 293-94.
18. See id. at 297-98.
19. Id. at 298.
20. See id. at 297-98.
21. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112, 116-22.
22. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
23. Id. at 297; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).
24. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
25. See id. at 286-87.
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residents who were injured while traveling through Oklahoma.2 6 The Robinsons
purchased an Audi in New York from Seaway Volkswagen.27 One year later, the
Robinsons left New York to move across country to Arizona.28 While passing
through Oklahoma, the plaintiffs's Audi was hit in the rear by another car, causing
a fire which severely burned the plaintiffs.2 9 The plaintiffs brought a products
liability suit in Oklahoma, claiming that theirinjuries resulted from defective design
in the Audi's fuel system.30 The plaintiffs sued the automobile's manufacturer and
members of the manufacturer's distribution network.3 Audi's regional distributor,
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., and its retail dealer, Seaway, raised the issue that
Oklahoma could not assert personal jurisdiction.32 The plaintiffs presented no
evidence that the defendants had any contact with Oklahoma outside of the location
of the accident involving the Audi that was sold to the plaintiffs in New York.3 3
The Court refused to allow jurisdiction to be based on one isolated occurrence
in which the plaintiffs who bought an Audi in New York happened to be involved
in an accident in Oklahoma. 34 Because an automobile is mobile by its design, it is
foreseeable that an Audi sold in New York could cause injury in Oklahoma.3 Yet,
foreseeability of the injury alone is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.3 6
It must be foreseeable to the defendant based on its conduct and connection with the
forum State that it could be haled into court in the forum state.37 Non-resident
defendants should foresee being haled into court where the manufacturer or
distributor spent effort to serve the forum state's market either directly or
indirectly. 38 Therefore, a forum state may assertjurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause when an entity "delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the
expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State., 39 The
Court found a total absence of any circumstances indicating that the defendant

26. Id. at 288. The plaintiffs were Harry and Kay Robinson and their two children. The entire family was New
York residents. The family was moving from New York to Arizona when they were involved in a car accident in
Oklahoma. Id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 288.
29. See id.
30. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288.
31. See id. The plaintiffs joined the manufacturer Audi, its importer Volkswagen of America, Inc., its regional
distributor, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., and its retail dealer Seaway. Id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 289. World-Wide and Seaway are both incorporated with their principal place of business in New
York. Neither defendant "does any business in Oklahoma, ships or sells any products to or in that State, has an
agent to receive process there, or purchases advertisements in any media calculated to reach Oklahoma." Id.
34. See id at 295.
35. See id
36. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295. The court reiterated language used in Hanson v. Denekla
that "forseeability alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the due process
clause. The forseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find
its way into the forum State." Il
37. See id. at 297.

38. See id. It is no longer unreasonable for the Court to assert jurisdiction if the product has been marketed for
the forum state and the allegedly defective product caused the injury. Id.
39. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298. (citing Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 176 N.E. 2d 761 (M. 1961)).
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Volkswagen served the Oklahoma market and refused to allow the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant.' Jurisdiction over the defendants was unreasonable
and in violation of the Due Process Clause because the defendants did not have a
sufficient connection with Oklahoma to justify jurisdiction under the stream of
commerce theory.4 '
B. Asahi
After applying the stream of commerce theory in World-Wide Volkswagen to
non-resident defendants, the court applied the theory to foreign defendants inAsahi
Metal Industry v. SuperiorCourt.42 In Asahi, the Court was deciding "whether the
mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant that the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the United States would reach the forum State in
the stream of commerce constitutes 'minimum contacts' between the defendant and
the forum State. ' 43 The court concluded that jurisdiction was unfair under the
reasonableness factors analysis.' A majority of the court was not able to decide,
though, how much contact is required by the defendant for the forum state to
exercise jurisdiction under the stream of commerce theory! 5
The facts of Asahi helped the court to conclude that jurisdiction would be
unreasonable because the only claim left involved two foreign parties.4 6 Asahi
involved a products liability suit by a California citizen against a Taiwanese
manufacturer of a motorcycle tire tube.47 While driving his motorcycle on an
Interstate in California, Gary Zurcher lost control and collided with a tractor.4" He
was severely injured and his passenger was killed.49 He alleged that his rear tire
exploded after a sudden loss of air because the motorcycle tire, tube, and sealant
were defective.5" Zurcher sued the Talwanese manufacturer of the tube, Cheng Shin
Rubber Industrial Co.5 ' The Taiwanese manufacturer filed a cross-complaint
seeking indemnification from Asahi Metal Industry Co., the Japanese manufacturer
of the tube's valve assembly.5" Cheng Shin settled all of its claims with Zurcher,
leaving only the indemnification claim against Asahi.53 The Supreme Court

40. See id. at298. Seaway's sales are madein MassenaNew York only, and World-Wide Volkswagen's market
is limited to dealers in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Id.
41. See id. at 286-87.
42. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
43. Id. at 105.
44. See i at 114.
45. See id. at 112-16.
46. See id. at 106.
47. See id. at 105.
48. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105.
49. See id.
50. See Ia.
at 106.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. The Court placed emphasis on the fact that both parties in the litigation were foreign companies in
assessing the reasonable factors. Id.
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ultimately refused to exercisepersonaljurisdiction over the indemnification claim. 4
The Court agreed that exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant

would be unfair under the "reasonableness factors" analysis, even though a majority
of the Justices could not agree on whether a purposeful contact existed under the

minimum contacts analysis.5

Under the reasonableness factors, the Court

considered the "burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the

plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief."56 The degree of burden on the defendant is
given significant weight when a foreign defendant is involved.57 The Court also
considered that the procedural and substantive policies of Japan and Taiwan would

be affected by the state of California's assertion of jurisdiction over the alien
defendant. 8 Because the only claim left involved two foreign parties, the Court

emphasized that a state should exercise great care when extending jurisdiction into
the international field.59 Not only was the burden too high on Asahi, California's
interest in the litigation was nonexistent, and the plaintiff did not demonstrate that
it was more convenient to litigate the indemnification claim against Asahi in

California rather than its foreign country. 0
While the Court agreed that the exercise of jurisdiction violated due process
based on the reasonableness factors, the Court did not obtain a majority view on the
issue of purposeful contact.61 The Court issued three different opinions on whether
the defendant had "purposefully availed" itself of the forum State to satisfy the
minimum contacts test under the stream of commerce theory.6 2 Justice O'Connor
concluded that the mere placement of a product in the stream of commerce is not

enough to establish a purposeful contact; the defendant needs additional conduct.63

The defendant must purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities
in the forum states, or direct intentional acts towards the forum state to be subject
to jurisdiction.' "But a defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce may

54. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116. A unanimous Court decided that the exercise ofjurisdiction would offend the
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" because the reasonableness factors weighed against the
exercise of jurisdiction without a majority establishing if a purposeful contact existed. Id. at 115-16.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 115 (citing United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378,404 (1965)).
58. See id. The procedural and substantive policies of other nations whose interests will be affected by the
exercise of jurisdiction were taken into consideration since the only remaining issue was whether a Japanese
corporation should indemnify a Taiwanese corporation on the basis of a sale made in Taiwan. Id.
59. See id.
60. See Asahi, 480 U.s. at 114-16. The burden was too high on Asahi because it had no offices in California,
no property or agents in California, solicited no business and no direct sales in California, it also did not design
or control the system of distribution that carried its product into California. California's interest in providing its
citizens a forum was diminished since the plaintiff was a Taiwanese corporation. Id.
61. See id.
at 112-16.
62. See id at 105, 108. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell, and Justice
Scalia in her plurality opinion. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun in his
minimum contacts analysis. Id. at 116. Justices White and Marshall also joined Justice Steven's opinion. Id. at
121.
63. See i at 112.
64. See id Examples of additional conduct indicating an intent or purpose to serve the market: "designing the
product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing
regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to
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or will sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of

placing the product into the stream an act purposefully directed towards the forum
State."'6 Justice O'Connor concluded that Asahi did not demonstrate any additional

conduct purposefully directed towards California in order to justify asserting
jurisdiction.6 6
In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, Justice
Marshall, and Justice Blackmun, disagreed with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that
Asahi did not "purposely avail itself of the California market."'67 Justice Brennan
found that as long as the defendant was aware that the final product was being
marketed in the forum state, the possibility of a lawsuit was foreseeable enough to
make the exercise ofjurisdiction reasonable. 8 No additional conduct was needed
to find a purposeful contact under the stream of commerce theory.69 He argued that
the burden of the potential litigation is not outweighed by the benefit the defendant
receives economically from the sale of the final product in the forum State.7" Even
though Justice Brennan held that jurisdiction was unreasonable under the
reasonableness factors analysis, he concluded that Asahi had established a
purposeful contact under the stream of commerce theory.71
Demonstrating the diversity of opinions in the case, Justice Stevens wrote
separately.72 He argued that Justice O'Connor's opinion mistakenly assumes that
an "unwavering line can be drawn between 'mere awareness' that a component will
find its way into the forum state and 'purposeful availment' of the forum's
market."7" Justice Steven's opinion strongly suggested that an examination of
minimum contacts was not even necessary since the court found that the exercise
of jurisdiction would be unfair under the reasonableness factors analysis.74
No opinion in Asahi commanded a majority regarding what level of contact
is required by a defendant for the forum state to exercise jurisdiction under the

serve as the sales agent in the forum State." Id.
65. Id. at 112-13.
66. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112-13. Justice O'Connor argued that even if Asahi was aware that some of its
valves would be incorporated into tire tubes sold in California, no additional conduct was demonstrated that Asahi
purposefully availed itself of the California market. Id. at 113. "Asahi has no offices, agents, employees, or
property in California. It does not advertise or otherwise solicit business in California. It did not create, control,
or employ the distribution system that brought its valves into California." Id.
67. Id. at 116.
68. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan found that Asahi was aware of the marketing of its
product in California because of the sales to his manufacturer making the assertion ofjurisdiction reasonable under
the stream of commerce theory. Id. at 121. Yet, Justice Brennan agreed with the Court that the reasonableness
factors weighed too heavily against assertion of jurisdiction to comport with fair play. Id. at 116.
69. See id. at 117. (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan argued that the requirement ofadditional conduct
was a retreat from World-Wide Volkswagen. Id. at 118. He argued that World-Wide Volkswagen only required
that a defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum state. Id. at 117-18.
70. Seeid. "These benefits accrueregardless ofwhether thatparticipant directly conducts business in the forum
State, or engages in additional conduct directed toward that State." Id. at 117.
71. See id. at 116.
72. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121.
73. Id. at 121. Justice Stevens argued that to decide whether conduct rises to the level of purposeful availment,
a determination must be made regarding the volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the components.
Id. at 122.
74. See id.
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stream of commerce theory. 75 Therefore, the minimum contacts analysis of the
stream of commerce theory was not clarified by Asahi, but only further befuddled.
The Supreme Court's decision in World-Wide Volkswagen thatjurisdiction over the
manufacturer must arise from the efforts of the manufacturer to serve the market
either directly or indirectly still stands as the last decision commanding a majority
of the court on the level of contact needed to establish minimum contacts under the
stream of commerce theory.76 Due to the current state of the stream of commerce
theory, the circuit courts have been left to decipher which opinion appropriately
addresses the level of conduct required for minimum contact in product liability
cases.

77

III. THE DIFFERENT PATHS OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS AFTERASAHI
The failure of the Supreme Court to obtain a majority view on the amount
of contact required under the stream of commerce theory has unsettled the law of
personal jurisdiction in product liability suits.7 The circuit courts use varied
approaches in applying the stream of commerce analysis in product liability cases
that involve a nonresident defendant.7 9 Three of the circuit courts are avoiding the
debate over the proper minimum contacts analysis by basing their decisions upon
the facts presented in the record."0 The Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits choose
to apply all three minimum contacts analyses used in Asahi to the facts in the record
without supporting one analysis over the other.8" The Fourth and Tenth Circuits
reconciled the decisions in World-Wide Volkswagen andAsahiin order to apply one
test." The First Circuit is the only circuit to conclusively adopt the position of
Justice O'Connor in applying the stream of commerce analysis in product liability
suits.8 3 Because Asahi did not command a majority of the Court on the amount of
contact required under stream of commerce, three of the circuits still apply the
standard in World-Wide Volkswagen.84 Even though these circuits are in the
minority, most all of the circuits use World-Wide Volkswagen language in applying
the facts to the stream of commerce test.8 Therefore, the stream of commerce test
was not changed by Asahi as evident from the use of the language of World-Wide
Volkswagen by most all the circuits.

75.
76.
77.
78.

See discussion infra Part IL
See discussion infraPart IL
See discussion infraPart Il.
See discussion infra Part ILB.

79. See discussion infra Part IlL

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See discussion infra Part ILA.1-3.
See discussion infra Part II.A.1-3.
See Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945 (4th Cir. 1994).
See Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods. Inc., 967 F.2d 671,682-83 (lst Cir. 1992).
See discussion infra Part IELD.1-3.
See discussion infra Part Il.
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A. Choosing not to Choose
The majority of the circuits avoid being involved in the debate over the stream
of commerce theory and thus engage in lengthy analyses regarding purposeful
contacts.8 6 The Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits apply all the minimum contacts
analyses in Asahi to the facts in the record in order to avoid choosing one test over
another." In analyzing their facts, though, the circuits utilize the language of
World-Wide Volkswagen in describing a 'purposeful contact' under the different
theories.88 The standard set in World-Wide Volkswagen is still used by the circuits
since Asahi did not clarify what a 'purposeful contact' required.
1. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit continued with precedent in its jurisdiction by choosing not
not to decide which minimum contacts analysis to apply. 89 In Pennzoil Products
Co. v. Colelli & Ass'n,9 the court engaged in a discussion of all three different
analyses inAsahi to arrive at its conclusion that "since the facts of this (case) satisfy
the standards of both Asahi pluralities, we do not have occasion to select one
standard or the other as the law of this circuit."9" Pennzoil Productsinvolved a suit
by an oil refinery against corporations that sold solvent to oil producers that
subsequently sold their crude oil to the refinery.9 2 Colelli sold to crude oil
producers in Ohio a solvent designed to reduce the accumulation of wax in the
shafts of oil wells.93 The oil producers subsequently sold the oil to refineries.94 The
Pennzoil refinery alleged that the solvent caused damage to its refinery because the
oil was tainted with silicon.95 Coleli filed a motion to dismiss the suit for lack of
personal jurisdiction, claiming that Pennsylvania's exercise ofjurisdiction violated
Due Process.96 The Third Circuit ultimately held that jurisdiction could be
exercised over the defendant under the stream of commerce theory. 7
In reaching its conclusion that personal jurisdiction existed over the defendant,

86. See discussion infra Part IILA.1-3.
87. See discussion infra Part IIA.1-3.
88. See discussion infra Part IILA.1-3.

89. See Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assoc., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 1998) in which the court
follows their decision in Renner v. Lanard Toys Ltd. 33 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 1994) to not adopt one analysis over
another. Renner involved a products liability suit against a Hong Kong manufacturer of a toy plane which allegedly
exploded and injured Renner. 33 F.3d at 278. Even though the court held that one analysis in Asahi was not being
used over another, the court employed language from World-Wide Volkswagen in deciding that "the mere
knowledge or awareness that one's products will end up in the forum state without some regularity of shipment
would not be enough. The contact must be purposeful, rather than incidental ....
" Id. at 282. See also WorldWide Volk ,agen,444 U.S. at 297-98.
90. 149 F.3d 197 (3rd Cir. 1998).

91. Id. at207n.13.
92. See id. at 199.
93. See id.

94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Pennzoil, 149 F.3d at 200.

97. See id.
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the Third Circuit first defined the stream of commerce test with the analysis from
World-Wide Volkswagen." The court held that the defendant must have the
necessary minimum contacts with the forum state "for the defendant to have
reasonably anticipated being haled into court there."99 In product liability suits it
is reasonable for jurisdiction to be "asserted over a nonresident defendant which
injected its goods, albeit indirectly, into the forum state and . . . derived a

substantial benefit from the forum state."' 1°
In deciding whether Colelli had served the forum state to establish jurisdiction,
the court discussed the Asahi decision and its failure to reach a majority."0 ' After
discussing all three opinions in Asahi, the court noted that "since Justice
O'Connor's standard is more demanding than Justice Brennan's, any factual
scenario that satisfies the former will probably satisfy the latter as well."" The
court was able to establish jurisdiction under both Justice O'Connor's and Justice
Brennan's test because of Colelli's contacts with the forum state. 3 Justice
O'Connor's test requiring additional conduct had been met from the fact that Colelli
had established "channels for providing regular advice to Pennzoil's personnel" and
sent samples to Pennzoil's laboratories demonstrating an intent to "design" a
product to serve the forum state."° Justice Brennan's test of simply placing the
product into the stream of commerce was easily satisfied because Colelli placed its
solvents into the stream of commerce and benefitted from its sales. 5 The court
avoided choosing a stream of commerce analysis in Asahi because it found
sufficient contacts by Colelli under both analyses that illustrated Colelli had served
the forum market."0 6 The Third Circuit employed the World-Wide Volkswagen
standard that a non-resident manufacturer must either directly or indirectly serve the
forum market since Asahi did not clarify the level of contact required to assert
jurisdiction with a majority of the court.' 0 7
2. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit did not engage in a lengthy discussion of the three different
minimum contact analyses set forth in Asahi as did the Third Circuit, but it also did
not choose one analysis over another to decide the facts in the record.'08 In a very

98. See id at201.
99. Id.
100. Id.at 203.

101. See iLat204.
102. Pennzoil, 149 F.3d at 199 n.11.

103. See id. at 206-07.
104. See id. at 206. Justice O'Connor's requirement of additional conduct was also met because Colelli had a
number of telephone conversations with lab personnel at the refinery which in effect established channels into the
forum state. Id. The Court also noted that even Justice Stevens standard was met, even though it is not essential
to the analysis. "The relative volume and value of the silicon-laced oil forwarded to Pennsylvania... (was) sixty
percent of the crude oil generated by the Ohio producers. Id. at 206 n.12.

105. See id.
at 207.
106. See id. at 205-07.
107. See id. at 201, 203-04.

108. See Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods. Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 543-44 (6th Cir. 1993).
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short analysis, the Sixth Circuit used the same rationale as the Third Circuit in
deciding that if the more stringent Asahi plurality test was met, the exercise of
jurisdiction would be proper under any test currently in use by the different
courts." 9 The Sixth Circuit also avoided defining the stream of commerce test with
either language from World-Wide Volkswagen or Asahi by simply reasoning that
enough facts existed to assert jurisdiction."'
The Sixth Circuit addressed the stream of commerce debate in Tobin v. Astra
PharmaceuticalProducts,Inc."' Tobin involved a suit by Kathy Tobin against a
Dutch drug manufacturer, Duphar B.V., and Astra Pharmaceutical, its United States
distributor." 2 Tobin received ritodrine, a drug manufactured by Duphar, during her
pre-term labor." 3 The dosages would increase when the contractions increased
during labor." 4 When given the drug, her heart would race, and her legs and hands
would swell. "5 After other complications, she was taken off ritodrine and delivered
healthy twins." 6 A month after being discharged from the hospital, Tobin had a
heart transplant from complications with the drug." 7 After Duphar was dismissed
for lack of personal jurisdiction, a jury found Astra liable for defective design and
failure to warn for the conditions that led to Tobin's hear transplant." s
The Sixth Circuit ruled on appeal that dismissal of Duphar was inappropriate
since Duphar had sufficient contacts to satisfy the stream of commerce test even
under the Asahi plurality requirements of Justice O'Connor, which requires more
than just mere awareness." 9 Duphar designed the product for the United States in
its efforts to obtain FDA approval and made direct efforts to avail itself of the
markets in each state by negotiating a licensing agreement with Astra
Pharmaceuticals.'
The court based its holding on the amount of contacts
established in the record to find jurisdiction proper over the defendant and thus
avoided defining purposeful availment under either World-Wide Volkswagen or
Asahi.'2 '

3. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted the same position as the courts already
109. See id. at 543. The court stated the "even under the test set forth in the plurality opinion of Asahi.....
Duphar (the defendant) has contact that is "something more" than mere awareness that the stream of commerce
will sweep the product into the forum state." Id.

110. See id.
111. 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993).
112. Id. at 532. Duphar B.V. is a corporation in the Netherlands that manufacturers ritodrine.
Pharmaceutical is Duphar's United States distributor. Id.
113. See id.

Astra

114. See id.
115. Seeid.
116. See id.
117. See Tobin, 993 F.2d at 532.
118. Seeid.

119. See id. at 543.
120. See id. at 543-44.

121. See id.
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In
discussed because it also chose to not join the minimum contacts debate.'
Vermeulen v. Renault,1" the Eleventh Circuit decided the case based on the facts
in the record and concluded that since enough facts existed to find jurisdiction
under Justice O'Connor's more stringent test, the court did not need to determine
which analysis in Asahi actually controlled the case.2 4 The court used the WorldWide Volkswagen standard to establish jurisdiction because it reasoned that since
Renault had "directly targeted" its cars toward the United States, it could reasonably
expect to be subject to suit there."z Vermeulen involved a products liability suit by
a car owner against Renault, a French manufacturer, alleging defective design and
manufacture.12 6 . Laura Vermeulen suffered a spinal injury leaving her a quadriplegic after an accident in her Renault LeCar in Georgia. 27 Vermeulen alleged that her
injuries were the result of negligent manufacture and design of the car's passenger
restraint system. 8 The court held that Vermeulen
established jurisdiction over
29
Renault, reversing the district court's dismissal.
In deciding that jurisdiction was proper, the court examined in detail each of
the three decisions on the proper minimum contacts analysis in Asahi and was able
to find facts to support jurisdiction under all analyses. 3 Renault delivered its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they would be
purchased in the United States, thus satisfying Justice Brennan's test.' 3' Renault
also met Justice O'Connor's test because it designed the car for the American
market, advertised its product in the United States, and established channels here
for providing advice to its customers. t3 2 The court characterized Justice Brennan's
holding in Asahi that the "additional conduct showing was not necessary" as a
liberal reading of World-Wide Volkswagen.133 The liberal characterization of
Justice Brennan's view compared with the stringent view of Justice O'Connor's
explains why many courts are still following the standard set in World-Wide

122. See Vermeulen v. Renault, U.S.A. Inc., 985 F.2d 1534, 1548 (1 lth Cir. 1993). The Eleventh Circuit has
changed its position on the stream of commerce analysis from an earlier decision. Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510,
1519 (1 Ith Cir. 1990). In Madara,the court concluded that a defendant must satisfy Justice O'Connor's stream
of commerce test in order to exercise jurisdiction. Id.
123. 985 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1993).

124. See id. at 1548.
125. See id. at 1550.
126. Id. at 1537. Renault is the manufacturer and designer of the 1982 LeCar, a corporation which is wholly
owned by the French government. Id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 1541.
129. See Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1537.
130. See id. at 1547-48. The Court detailed each of the examples Justice O'Connor listed in her requirement for
"additional conduct" by the defendant. id. at 1547. The Court also mentioned Justice Steven's requirement of
analyzing the "volume, the value, and the hazardous character of the components." Id.
131. See id. at 1548.
132. See id. at 1549. Renault also took an active role in training personnel in repair, servicing, and preparation
of Renault products, and created and controlled the distribution network that brought its products into the United

States. Id. at 1550.
133. Id. at 1547. The Court quoted Justice Brennan's language that the "stream of commerce refers not to
unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture to
distribution to retail sale." Id.
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Volkswagen, since its standard represents more of a middle view.134
Even though the Eleventh Circuit found jurisdiction by applying the facts to
all three analyses in Asahi, the court employed the language of the World-Wide
13 5
Volkswagen standard in its holding to establish that jurisdiction was reasonable.
Renault demonstrated that it had attempted to serve the forum market because it
directly targeted its LeCars toward that United States and took numerous steps to
ensure the car would be brought to the United States.136 Due to all the contacts
Renault had with the United States it could "fairly expect to defend in this country
the very type of action this case presents: a personal injury action challenging the
'
The Eleventh Circuit also noted after its conclusion that
car's design and safety."137
"in the absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court, several courts have
declined to follow the Asahi plurality's analysis, and have instead continued 1to
38
apply the "stream of commerce" approach adopted in World-Wide Volkswagen."
The language of World-Wide Volkswagen, coupled with the reference to cases still
applying the standard in World-Wide Volkswagen, illustrates how the standard set
forth in World-Wide Volkswagen is still the precedent for the stream of commerce
theory, since Asahi did not raise or lower the standard with a majority of the Court.
The circuits which chose to not be involved in the debate over minimum
contacts illustrate that Asahi did not give any guidance on how to define "purposeful availment" under the stream of commerce theory. Asahi's lack of guidance
forces courts to painstakingly consider if the facts in each case meet Justice
O'Connor's more stringent test, which enables the court to satisfy subsequent
different analyses.1 39 These courts use the language set forth in World-Wide
Volkswagen that jurisdiction must arise from the efforts of the non-resident
defendant to serve the forum state in order to define purposeful availment because
Asahi did not clarify the amount of contact required under the stream of commerce
theory.140 Through their use of language, the circuits impliedly use World-Wide
Volkswagen as the stream of commerce analysis illustrating that Asahi did not
change the standard.

134. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. The World-Wide Volkswagen standard for purposeful
availment is the middle view because it establishes jurisdiction based on the efforts of the manufacturer to serve
directly or indirectly the forum State's market therefore making it reasonable to subject it to suit in one of those
States. Justice O'Connor's view requires additional conduct above and beyond placing the product in the stream
of commerce while Justice Brennan's view requires only that the defendant be aware the final product is being
marketed in the forum state. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112, 116.
135. See Vermeulen, 985 F.2d at 1550.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 1548. The Court lists examples of the courts choosing to follow the standard set forth in World-Wide
Volk vagen. Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1989); DeMoss v. City
Market, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 913,918 (D. Utah 1991); Abuan v. General Electric Co., 735 F. Supp. 1479, 1483 (D.
Guam 1990); Curtis Management Group v. Academy of Motion Pictures Arts & Sciences, 717 F. Supp. 1362,1369
(S.D. Ind. 1989); Wessinger v. Vetter Corp., 685 F. Supp. 769, 776-77 (D. Kan. 1987); Hall v. Zambelli, 669 F.

Supp. 753,756 (S.D. W. Va. 1987).
139. See supra notes 102, 124, and accompanying text.
140. See discussion infra Part IILA.1-3.
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B. Reconciling World-Wide Volkswagen andAsahi
The Fourth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit both reconciled World-Wide
Volkswagen andAsahi in deciding if a defendant directed his activities toward the
forum state sufficient to establish jurisdiction. 4 ' While the Fourth Circuit analyzed
the stream of commerce debate in a products liability suit, 42 the Tenth Circuit has
not addressed the issue in a products liability setting. The Tenth Circuit addressed
the issue of a purposeful contact in a suit to establish a duty to defend by liability
insurers. 4 3

1. Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit took an approach different than the previous mentioned
circuits which chose to apply the facts to both Justice O'Connor's and Justice
Brennan's analyses in Asahi.'4 The Fourth Circuit reconciled World-Wide
Volkswagen andAsahi with prior Supreme Court precedent by interpreting WorldWide Volkswagen narrowly.' 45 By its reading of World-Wide Volkswagen, a
defendant must purposely direct his or her activities toward the forum state to
satisfy the stream of commerce test.'46 After Asahi, the Fourth Circuit interpreted
the stream of commerce test to still require the same, illustrating once again that
Asahi did not change the stream of commerce standard established in World-Wide
Volkswagen. 47
The Fourth Circuit addressed the debate over the stream of commerce theory
in Lesnick v. Hollingsworth& Vose Co.,' 48 a products liability suit brought by the
estate of a deceased cigarette smoker against a corporation that had provided
asbestos containing filters for cigarettes.' 49 Beverly Lesnick brought suit after her
husband died from lung cancer. 5 She alleged that the filters in Kent brand
cigarettes that were manufactured by Hollingsworth & Vose Co. were part of her
husband's death because of the asbestos incorporated into the filters. 5' Lesnick
sued both Hollingsworth & Vose Co. and Lorillard, Inc. because Hollingsworth &
Vose manufactured the filter and then shipped it to Lorillard's plants.'52 Only
Hollingsworth & Vose asserted the claim of lack of personal jurisdiction.'53
Factually, Hollingsworth & Vose provided Lorillard with material for approxi-

141.
142.
143.
144.

See discussion infra Part 111B.1-2.
See Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994).
See OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Insurance Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998).
See supra notes 168-70, and accompanying text.

145. See Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945 (4th Cir. 1994).
146. See id. at 943-44.
147. See id.
148. 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994).

149. See id. at 940.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See UeL

153. See id.
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mately 10 billion asbestos-containing filters which were incorporated into cigarettes
sold throughout the nation. 154 Lesnick alleged specifically that the defendants
"knew or should have known of the dangers of crocidolite asbestos at the time the
cigarettes and filters were manufactured, but that they failed to make improvements
in them or to warn the public of these dangers.""15 In denying jurisdiction, the court
concluded that Hollingsworth
& Vose' s activities were not directed toward serving
15 6
the forum state.
In discussing whether Hollingsworth & Vose had purposefully availed
themselves of the forum state by directing their product toward its market, the court
discussed in detail both World-Wide Volkswagen andAsahi.1 57 The Fourth Circuit
held that the stream of commerce test in World-Wide Volkswagen indicates that "the
Court has not abandoned the notion thatjurisdiction must rest on a person's activity
' In analyzingAsahi, the court noted
deliberately directed toward the forum state."158
that the Supreme Court failed in its attempts to clarify the language in World-Wide
Volkswagen that a "mere placement of goods in the stream of commerce subjects
a plaintiff to suit in any state where the goods might foreseeably cause injury."15 9
Instead of involving itself in the stream of commerce debate, the Fourth Circuit
chose to reconcile the two decisions with past Supreme Court precedent. 6 The
court held that "our reading of World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi is that the
Supreme Court has not abandoned the InternationalShoe 61 two-pronged test as
further articulated in Hanson62 & Burger King."'163 The court held that the
minimum contacts analysis for the stream of commerce test requires that an out-ofstate person have engaged in some activity purposely directed toward the forum
state." 4 Hollingsworth & Vose had no activity purposefully directed towards the
forum state.1 65 The only contact with the forum state was through its relationship
with Lorillard' s contacts.166 The company's relationship in selling cigarettes did not

154.
155.
156.
157.

See Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 940.
See id.
See id. at 946-47.
See id. at 943-45.

158. Id. at 943. The court recognized that World-Wide Volkswagen has been interpreted to only require that a
product be placed into the stream of commerce with the expectation that it will be purchased by consumers in the
forum state in order to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. (citing e.g., Bean Dredging
Corp. v. Dredge Technology Corp., 744 F.2d 1081, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1984), Nelson v. Park Industries, Inc., 717
F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1277, 1278 (1984)). However, the Fourth circuit
interpreted the holding to be "much narrower, requiring purposeful activity on the part of the defendants to
establish a meaningful contact with the forum state." Id. at 944.
159. Id. at 944. The Fourth Circuit discussed Justice O'Connor's view as siding with those courts that have
rejected the broad reading of World-Wide Volkswagen that if a manufacturer is simply aware that its product may
be sold in the forum state, jurisdiction may be allowed. UnderJustice O'Connor's view, World-Wide Volkswagen
should be read as requiring more of the defendant than just mere knowledge. Id.
160. See Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 945.

161. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1957).
162. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,253 (1958).
163. Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 945; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,475 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
164. See Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 945.
165. See id. at 946-47.

166. See id, at 946.
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rise to the level of establishing jurisdiction because the conduct (the relationship)
was not directed toward the forum state. 167
In trying to reconcile the cases, the court has without explaining its reasons
concluded that Asahi did not affect the stream of commerce test established in
World-Wide Volkswagen. 68 By its reading of World-Wide Volkswagen, it required
a defendant to purposely direct his or her activities toward the forum state to
establish a meaningful contact. 169 AfterAsahi, the Fourth Circuit still interprets the
stream of commerce test to require that a person purposefully direct his or her
activities toward the forum state. 7 ' Even though the court approached the current
debate over the stream of commerce analysis in a different way than the previously
mentioned courts, the Fourth Circuit relied on the precedent set in World-Wide
Volkswagen without allowing the three different opinions in Asahi to have changed
the standard. 7 '
2. Tenth Circuit
For non-resident defendants, product liability cases are not the only setting in
which the stream of commerce debate after Asahi occurred. 72 Since Asahi, the
Tenth Circuit has not addressed the stream of commerce debate in a products
liability case.'73 The Tenth Circuit explored the issue of what level of contact is
required to assert jurisdiction in a suit to establish a duty to defend by liability
insurers in OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Insurance Co. of Canada.74 The Tenth
Circuit has not directly addressed the on-going debate involving the stream of
commerce test after Asahi,' but in OMIHoldingsit applied
the purposeful contact
176
analysis using both Asahi and World-Wide Volkswagen.
OMIHoldings,Inc. v. Royal Insurance Co. of Canada7 7 involved a suit by a
defendant in a patent infringement suit to establish the duty to defend against
several of its liability insurers.'7 8 In examining whether the insurers had minimum
contacts with the forum state, the Tenth Circuit applied a two-fold analysis

167. See id. at 946-47.
168. See id at 943-45.
169. See id at 944.
170. See Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 945.
171. See id at 943-45.
172. See Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585
(1991). Shute involved a personal injury suit by a passenger aboard Carnival Cruise Lines for injuries sustained
in a slip and fall. Id. at 379. The Ninth Circuit applied the facts in the record and found jurisdiction under both
Justice O'Connor's and Justice Brennan's analysis inAsahi. See id. at 381-82. See also Beverly Hills Fan Co. v.
Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Beverly HillsFan Co. involved a suit by Beverly, a holder
of a design patent for ceiling fans against Ultec, the manufacturer and importer of the fans allegedly infringing on
Beverly's patent. Id. at 1560. The Federal Circuit also used the facts in the record to find jurisdiction reasonable
under either Asahi tests. See id. at 1566.
173. See OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Insurance Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1998).

174. See id. at 1089-90.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See id. at 1092-93.
See Packenvare Corp., 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
149 F.3d 1068 (10th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 1089-90.
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incorporating bothAsahi and World-Wide Volkswagen.17 9 The court first employed
the language of World-Wide Volkswagen to decide "whether the defendant has such
minimum contacts with the forum state 'that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there."' 80 As part of this question, the court used Asahi's plurality
test to decide if these contacts resulted from "actions by the defendant himself that
create a substantial connection with the forum state."' 1 Because of these
established standards, the court held it must examine "the quantity and quality" of
the defendant's contacts with the forum state.' 82
In examining the insurer's contacts, the court found that the defendant insurer
demonstrated some showing of minimum contacts with the forum state based on the
territory coverage clause, yet the court held that "sole reliance on the territory of
coverage clause creates contacts which are qualitatively low on the due process
scale."' 83 The court ultimately found jurisdiction unreasonable under the
reasonableness factors analysis.'84 Like the Fourth Circuit in Lesnick v.
Hollingsworth& Vose Co., 5 the Tenth Circuit reconciled World-Wide Volkswagen
andAsahi to establish one purposeful contact test to which it applied the facts in the
8 6
record to decide if jurisdiction was reasonable.
C. Adopting Justice O'Connor'sTest
The First Circuit is the only circuit to conclusively adopt one position set forth
in Asahi over another in product liability suits. The First Circuit in two recent
decisions has supported the analysis set forth by the Justice O'Connor plurality in
Asahi that additional conduct must accompany placing the product into the stream
of commerce. 8 7 The First Circuit upheld Justice O'Connor's analysis in Boit v.
Gar-Tec ProductsInc.'88 which was based on previous First Circuit decisions, and
an Eighth an Eleventh Circuit opinions, both of which have subsequently
changed.'8 9 Boit was then upheld by the First Circuit in Rodriguez v. Fullerton

179. See id. at 1091.
180. See id. (quoting Worldwide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
181. OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1091 (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 109).
182. OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1092.
183. Id. at 1095.
184. See id. at 1095-98. The court held that the burden on the defendant insurer was significant, the forum
state's interest in the litigation was low because neither plaintiffs nor defendants were forum state residents, the
plaintiffs could receive relief in an alternative forum, and exercising jurisdiction in the forum state would affect
the substantive social policies of a foreign country. Id.
185. 35 F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994).
186. See OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1091-92.
187. Rodriguez v. Fullerton Tires Corp., 115 F.3d 81,85 (lst Cir. 1997); Boitv. Gar-Tec Prods. Inc., 967 F.2d
671, 682-83 (lst Cir. 1992).
188. 967 F.2d 671 (Ist Cir. 1992).
189. See Boit,967 F.2d at 683 (citing Falkirk MNining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369,375-76 (8th
Cir. 1990); Madam v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1990); Keds Corp. v. Renee Int'l Trading Corp.,
888 F.2d 215, 220 (1st Cir. 1989); Hugel v. McNell, 886 F.2d 1, 4 (lst Cir. 1989) as those circuits which have
adopted Justice O'Connor's plurality view). The Eighth Circuit changed its position to follow the precedent of
World-Wide Volksvagen. SeeBaronev. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks, 25F.3d610, 614 (8th Cir. 1994).
The Eleventh Circuit now applies both Asahi tests refusing to choose one analysis over another. See Vermeulen
v. Renault, 985 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1993).
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Tires Corp.190 which relied exclusively on Boit and failed to discuss approaches
taken by other circuits.19
The First Circuit analyzed the stream of commerce theory in a pre-Asahi
decision, Rodriguez v. Hughes Aircraft Co."9 In Hughes Aircraft Co., the court
held that simply because the defendant knew that the two helicopters it sold to
another company were destined for the forum state, the defendant had not
purposefully engaged in other forum activities to be reasonable to haul it into court
in the forum state.193 In Hughes Aircraft Co., the court used World-Wide Volkswagen language acknowledging that the manufacturer must engage in purposeful
activities so that the defendant can expect to be taken to court in the forum state.'94
The First Circuit relied on its decision in Hughes Aircraft Co. to justify its
adoption of Justice O'Connor's analysis in Boit v. Gar-tecProductsInc.'95 Boit
involved a products liability action against a non-resident manufacturer of hot air
guns. 196 William Babson, a contractor who was working on the home of the Boits,
used an electric hot gun to strip paint from the exterior clapboards. 97 Babson
placed a written order with Brookstone for the hot air gun that was shipped through
the mail. 198 The gun was labeled "Gar-Tec," and the gun was shipped in a box
containing a manual with the name "Gar-Tec."' 99 The Boits alleged that the heat

from the hot air gun penetrated the exterior wall of their home and ignited materials
inside the wall, causing a fire that seriously damaged their home and belongings."' 0
The court affirmed the district court's finding that Gar-Tec was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the forum state.2"'
In denying jurisdiction, the court in Boit interpreted Asahi as not undermining
its decision in Hughes Aircraft Co.2" The Boit court made the leap that the
additional conduct Justice O'Connor proposed in Asahiis what makes it reasonable
to haul a defendant into court in the forum state, even though a majority of the
Supreme Court did not hold that the additional conduct was necessary.2 °3 The First
Circuit concluded that the minimum contacts standard required more than just the
mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce; the defendant must have

190. 115 F.3d 81 (lst Cir. 1997).

191. See id. at 85.
192. 781 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1986).

193. See 781 F.2d at 15. The defendants in HughesAircraftCo. sold two helicopters to a company which in turn
resold the helicopters to a police department in Puerto Rico. The court held that it was an "isolated splash," not
the type of transaction that could reasonably lead a manufacturer to believe it could be haled into court. The court
held that it did not matter whether Hughes knew that the helicopters were being sold to the police department in
Puerto Rico because the test is whether the defendant purposefully engaged in forum activities so it could be
reasonably haled into court there. Id.
194. See id.
195. 967 F.2d 671, 682-83 (1st Cir. 1992).
196. See id. at 673-74.
197. See id. at 673.
198. SeeicL at674.
199. See id.
200. See id.
at 673.
201. See Bolt, 967 F.2d at 673.
202. See id. at 682-83.
203. See id.
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designed, advertised, marketed, or established channels for providing advice in the
forum state.2' The First Circuit held that "those circuits that have squarely
addressed the stream-of-commerce issue since Asahi have adopted Justice
O'Connor's plurality view."20 5 The only evidence offered for its stance, though,
is two prior First Circuit cases, an Eleventh and an Eighth Circuit opinion both of
which have subsequently changed. 2"
Using Justice O'Connor's analysis, the First Circuit ultimately held that the
defendant in Boit did not possess the required minimum contacts forjurisdiction. 0 7
No evidence existed that the product was designed, advertised, or marketed in the
forum state.20" The court also relied on the fact that the plaintiffs could not cite a
post-Asahi case holding "that by placing a product into the stream of commerce
state a defendant
with knowledge that the product could end up in the forum
'2 9
purposefully established minimum contacts in that state. 0
The First Circuit upheld its decision in Boit in its later decision, Rodriguez v.
Fullerton Tires Corp.,21 holding again that additional conduct was necessary to
satisfy the stream of commerce theory. 21' FullertonTires Corp.involved a products
liability suit against a tire dealer who brought a third party complaint against a nonresident tire manufacturer. 12 The court simply held that Asahi was still good law
which required more that just mere knowledge that the stream of commerce would
213
bring the tire rims into the forum state in order to establish minimum contacts.
The First Circuit made no distinction between the language in World-Wide
Volkswagen requiring that a defendant have asserted its intent directly or indirectly
to serve the forum state such that it is reasonable to haul him into court, and Justice
O'Connor's plurality decision in Asahi in which she felt additional conduct such as
marketing or advertising the product in the forum state was needed by the defendant
to make jurisdiction reasonable.2 4 Even though the court relied on Justice
O'Connor's test, it did not address that Justice O'Connor's plurality view is a more
stringent test because of the requirement of additional conduct, and that Justice
Brennan's test of simply being aware the product is being marketed in the forum
state is a lower threshold. 215 The First Circuit no longer used the World-Wide
Volkswagen language that it had applied in its previous Hughes Aircraft Co.
decision because it assumed that the additional conduct in Justice O'Connor's test
was the amount of contact required to haul a defendant into court in the forum
state.2 16

204. See id. at 683.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. See Boit, 967 F.2d at 683.

208. See id. at 683.
209. See id.
210. 115 F.3d 81 (lstCir. 1997).

211. See id. at 85.
212. See id. at 82.

213. See id at 85.
214. See Boit, 967 F.2d at 682-83.
215. See Fullerton Tires Corp., 115 F.3d at 85.
216. See supra notes 194, 202-03, and accompanying text.
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D. Relying on the EstablishedPrecedentof World-Wide Volkswagen
While many of the circuits chose not to decide which stream of commerce
analysis to apply, a few of the circuits still explicitly opt to follow the established
precedent of World-Wide Volkswagen.217 World-Wide Volkswagen was the last
Supreme Court case to yield a majority consensus on the amount of contact required
to establish a purposeful contact under the stream of commerce theory." 8 Asahi not
only lacked a majority view on the purposeful contact issue, the facts of Asahi cause
the case to have a more narrower focus than World-Wide Volkswagen.2" 9 Asahi only
involved an indemnification suit by a foreign plaintiff against a foreign defendant.22
The facts of Asahi limit the discussion of a purposeful contact unlike the facts in
World-Wide Volkswagen.2"' World-Wide Volkswagen may have involved nonresident parties, but the case did not involve the foreign public policy issues present
in Asahi.22 2 Because both parties in Asahi were foreign, the Court was forced to
consider the substantive and procedural policies of Taiwan and Japan. 2 3 If
California asserted jurisdiction, the court would be asserting its authority over a
claim that did not concern the United States. 2 The Seventh, Eighth, and Fifth
Circuits have all recognized the problems in Asahi and followed the precedent set
in World-Wide Volkswagen, since Asahi did not by a majority change the
requirements of the stream of commerce theory.2 5
1. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit was the forerunner among the three circuits still following
the precedent set in World-Wide Volkswagen. 2 6 The Seventh circuit applied the
standard in World-Wide Volkswagen in aproducts liability suit against a nonresident
manufacturer of defective fireworks. ' 7 In Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 228 the
plaintiff, Dehmlow, was injured during a fireworks display at a high-school in
Illinois. 9 While acting as a shooter for the fireworks display for Bartolotta
Fireworks, Inc., Dehmlow suffered permanent injuries and disfigurement when one
of the fireworks manufactured and distributed by Austin Fireworks, the defendant,
217. See discussion infra Part ]Th.D.1-3.
218. See notes 1-8 supra,and accompanying text.
219. See discussion infraPart MiB.
220. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 103.
221. See Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks, 25 F.3d 610, 611-12 (8th Cir. 1994).
222. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See discussion infra Part IILD.1-3.
226. The Seventh Circuitdecided theircasein 1992 whiletheFifth circuit soon followed in 1993 with theEighth
Circuits first decision in 1994. See discussion infra Part II.D.1-3.
227. See Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941, 943 (7th Cir. 1992). The suit was brought by Craig
Dehmlow, an Illinois resident against Austin Fireworks, a Kansas corporation who manufactured and distributed
fireworks to a certain Wisconsin corporation who displayed fireworks in Illinois and throughout the Midwest. Id.
228. 963 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1992).
229. See id. at 943.
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improperly detonated. 3 ° Austin Fireworks is a Kansas corporation which
manufactured and distributed the fireworks used in the Illinois display." The
Seventh Circuit held that personal jurisdiction over Austin Fireworks was proper
under the stream of commerce theory in World-Wide Volkswagen. 32
The court began its discussion of whether the defendant Austin had enough
purposeful contacts under the stream of commerce theory with a discussion of
World-Wide Volkswagen. 3 In reiterating the Supreme Court's language, the court
held that a "forum state does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause
if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into
the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by
consumers in the forum state." 4 The Seventh Circuit stated that the Supreme
Court's decision in Asahi cast doubt on the stream of commerce theory because it
could not agree which level of contact was required under the stream of commerce
theory. 5 Instead of involving itself in the stream of commerce debate like many
of the circuits, the Seventh Circuit chose to decide its stream of commerce cases
under the familiar umbrella of precedent and follow the last Supreme Court decision
to receive a majority, World-Wide Volkswagen. 6 The court held:
[b]ecause the Supreme Court established the stream of commerce theory and a
majority of the Court has not yet rejected it, we consider that theory to be
determinative. We may not depart from Court precedent on the basis of a belief
that present
Supreme Court Justices would not readily agree with past Court
decisions. 23'
The stream of commerce theory also establishes an element of fairness
because a state has an interest in protecting its citizens against defendants who have
the benefit of modem transportation and communication to distribute their products
all over the world. 8 In asserting jurisdiction over Austin Fireworks, the court ruled
that the required contacts under the World-Wide Volkswagen standard existed based
on Austin Firework's national advertising, its regular Illinois customers, and its
agent's contacts in Illinois for firework displays. 9
Even though the Seventh Circuit appeared firm in its commitment to the
established precedent of World-Wide Volkswagen, the court recognized the split by

230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 947.
233. See id. at 946.
234. Dehnlow, 963 F.2d at 946 (quoting the Supreme court in World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98).
235. See Dehmlow, 963 F.2d at 947 (citingAsahi, 480 U.S. at 114-18).
236. See id. at 947. The Seventh Circuit chose to follow precedent because precedent is a course of conduct
which serves as a guide for future conduct in cases until the 'legal principle' is changed by subsequent cases.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1176 (6th ed. 1990).
237. Dehmlow, 963 F.2d at 947.
238. See id.

239. See id at 944.
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the court in Asahi and addressed Justice O'Connor's more stringent test.240 The
court held that the plaintiff also satisfied Justice O'Connor's test because the
defendant had purposefully directed its sale of fireworks toward the forum state and
by its actions showed an intent to serve the forum state's markets.4 t Interestingly,
though, in its conclusion under the stream of commerce theory, the Seventh Circuit
returned to the language of World-Wide Volkswagen.242 The court held that when
a defendant directed its conduct toward serving the forum state, it could not
complain that it could not have foreseen being haled into court in the forum state.243
Just like the previous circuits which chose to apply the facts to all the Asahi tests
and used the language in World-Wide Volkswagen to define the standard, the
Seventh Circuit used the language to define its standard under Asahi also.2' The
Seventh Circuit not only explicitly applied the test in World-Wide Volkswagen, it
also illustrated that even when a court applies the facts to the tests in Asahi, the
language in World-Wide Volkswagen must be used because Asahi did not change
the standard. 5
2. Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit is the most recent circuit to address the stream of
commerce debate, choosing to follow the established precedent set in World-Wide
Volkswagen. 46 Since theAsahi decision, the Eighth Circuit has issued two separate
opinions supporting World-Wide Volkswagen.247 Its most recent decision,
Vandelune v. 4B ElevatorComponents Unlimited,24 the Eighth Circuit relied on its
249
own precedent of Baronev. Rich Bros. InterstateDisplay FireworksCo.
The Eighth Circuit in Baronev. Rich Bros.InterstateDisplayFireworksCo. 210
upheld the World-Wide Volkswagen analysis in a products liability suit against a
foreign manufacturer of fireworks."
Bernard Barone was injured during a
fireworks display and sued the distributor as well as the manufacturer of the
fireworks, Hosoya Fireworks Co. of Tokyo, Japan 5 2 The Eighth Circuit ultimately

240. See id. at 947. The court tried to qualify their analysis by stating that since a more permissive stream of
commerce theory was used, it would address the plaintiff Dehmlow contention "that the facts of his case satisfy
even the more stringent minimum contacts test." Id.

241. See id.
242. See id. at 948. See also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
243. See Dehmlow, 963 F.2d at 948.

244. See id.
245. See id. at 947-48.
246. See Vandelunev. 4B Elevator Components Unlimited, 148 F.3d 943(8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,525 U.S.

1018 (1998).
247. See Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 1994); Vandelune v. 4B
Elevator Components Unlimited, 148 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 1998).
248. 148 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 1998).
249. 25 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 1994).

250. See id.
251. Id. at 610-14.
252. See id.at 611. Barone was employed by Highland Country Club of Omaha, Nebraska. The distributor was
Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co. Of Siox Falls, South Dakota, and two manufacturers, one which was
Hosoya. Id.
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concluded that Hosoya was subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum state
because the defendant indirectly served the forum market and reaped the benefits
of its distributors throughout the country. 3
The Eighth Circuit discussed the stream of commerce analysis by comparing
254
the language of World-Wide Volkswagen to Justice Brennan's opinion in Asahi.
The Eighth Circuit held that the Justices in Asahi who agreed that placement of a
product into the stream of commerce with the knowledge that the product would be
distributed into the forum state satisfied due process (Justice Brennan's view), were
"simply following the Court's earlier statement in World-Wide Volkswagen that
when a manufacturer or distributor attempts to serve a market directly or indirectly
....it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in [that market]. 25 5 Unlike the
Eleventh Circuit, which considered World-Wide Volkswagen the middle ground
between Justice O'Connor's view and Justice Brennan's view,25 6 the Eighth Circuit
held that the test is still the same under either Justice Brennan's view or WorldWide Volkswagen because Justice O'Connor's group was simply trying, but not
able, to raise the standard.5 7 The Eighth Circuit did not distinguish the fact that
Justice Brennan's test only required that a participant be aware that the product is
being marketed inthe forum state," while World-Wide Volkswagen required at
least indirect attempts to serve the forum state's market. 59
After reconciling World-Wide Volkswagen with Justice Brennan's concurring
view in Asahi, the court in Barone yielded support to its position to apply the
World-Wide Volkswagen standard.260 Quoting from the Seventh Circuit, the Eighth
Circuit held that "[b]ecause the Supreme Court established the stream of commerce
theory, and a majority of the court has not yet rejected it, we consider that theory
to be determinative." 26 1 Under a World-Wide Volkswagen standard, "there must be
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of... the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."2'62 The Barone court held
that the defendant was subject to the jurisdiction of the forum state because it
"poured its products into regional distributors throughout the country." 63 The
defendant Hosoya also reaped the benefits of its network of distributors such that
suit in the forum state was reasonable.26
In addition to realizing the value of following past precedent, the Eighth
Circuit also examined the issue of the limiting factual situation in Asahi that few

253. See id. at 615.
254. See id. at 614.

255. See id.
256. See supranote 134, and accompanying text.
257. See Barone, 25 F.3d at 614 n.4.
258. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117.
259. 444 U.S. at 297.
260. 25 F.3d at 614.
261. See id. (quoting Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963 F.2d 941,946 (7th Cir. 1992)).
262. See id. at 612; see also World-Wide Volksvagen, 444 U.S. at 291.
263. 25 F.3d at 615.
264. See id. Hosoya received between "a quarter ofa million and a million dollars worth offireworks (averaging
$640,000 annually over a six-year period), which constituted between fifty-one and ninety-two percent (averaging
just over seventy percent) of Hosoya's fireworks business." Id. at 611.
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courts address directly. 5 The Eighth Circuit held that "Asahi stands for no more
than that it is unreasonable to adjudicate third-party litigation between two foreign
companies in this country absent consent by the nonresident defendant."2'66 The
factual scenario limitedAsahi because the only claim left involved an indemnification claim between a Taiwanese corporation and a Japanese corporation. 67 The
Supreme Court did not even know if California law would govern an indemnification claim between the two foreign parties when the sale was made in Taiwan and
the shipment of goods in Japan.268
The Eighth Circuit upheld its decision in Baronein Vandelune v. 4B Elevator
Components Unlimited. 69 Vandelune involved a products liability suit by an
employee at Consolidated Cooperative Grain Elevator in Iowa against the British
manufacturer of a safety warning device used in grain elevators, Synatel Instrumentation Ltd.27 Vandelune was seriously injured in a grain dust explosion allegedly
caused by a faulty Speedswitch Monitor which failed to function properly.27 ' The
Speedswitch is supposed to stop the conveyer belt in the Elevator when its speed
is reduced by twenty percent of its normal operating speed.272 The claim asserted
that the warning device was not triggered until too late.27 Relying on World-Wide
Volkswagen, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court in holding that the
manufacturer had sufficient contacts under the stream of commerce theory to permit
jurisdiction.274
The trial court in Vandelune relied on Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi
and held that the defendant did not have enough purposeful activity directed
towards the forum state.27 The Eighth Circuit overruled the trial court based on a
previous Eighth Court decision27 6 which ruled that due to the Asahi split on what
level of contact is required under the stream of commerce theory to satisfy the due
process in a products liability case, the teachings of BurgerKing and World-Wide
Volkswagen would still be followed. 7 Under World-Wide Volkswagen, "a
manufacturer whose product ends up in the forum State on an 'attenuated, random,
or fortuitous' basis has not purposefully directed its activities at residents of that
State."27' 8 However, when a manufacturer puts his or her products "into a regional
distributor with the expectation that the distributor will penetrate a discrete, multi-

265. See id. at 614. No other circuit courts were found which specifically ruled that the Asahi holding could be
limited simply by the factually scenario since the only dispute left was an indemnification claim between two
foreign entities.
266. See Barone, 25 F3d at 614.
267. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114-15.
268. See id. at 115.
269. 148 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 1998).
270. Id. at 945.
271. See id
272. See id.
273. See id.
at 945-46.
274. See id. at 948.
275. 148 F.3d at 947.
276. See Barone, 25 F.3d at 615.
277. See Vandelune, 148 F.3d at 948.
278. See id. See also BurgerKing, 471 U.S. at 475; World-Wide Volksvagen, 444 U.S. at 296-97.
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State trade area, the manufacturer has "purposefully reaped the benefits" of the laws
of each State in that trade area for due process purposes." 79 Based on the design
of the product for the grain elevator market, the shipping of the product into the
region, and the amount of sales in Iowa, the court held that the defendant's motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction should have been denied. 80 In its two
value of World-Wide
decisions, the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the precedent
281
Volkswagen and recognized the limitations of Asahi.
3. Fifth Circuit
Recognizing that the precedent in World-Wide Volkswagen has not been
overruled by a majority of the Supreme Court, like the Eighth Circuit, the Fifth
Circuit also continued to follow the stream of commerce theory established in
World-Wide Volkswagen.282 The Fifth Circuit most recently addressed the stream
of commerce issue in a third party complaint for contribution in Ruston Gas
Turbines, Inc., v. Donaldson Co. 283 Ruston Gas involved a products liability suit
by Ruston against Donaldson over the manufacture and sale of two gas-turbine
engine systems. 284 Donaldson filed a third party complaint against Corchran, a
company which had manufactured certain component parts of the systems that
Donaldson sold to Ruston. 5 Corchran filed the motion to dismiss the third party
claim on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction, believing it did not have the
requisite contacts with the forum state.2 86 The Fifth Circuit held that jurisdiction
could be exercised over Corchran because he had intentionally placed his product
into the stream of commerce in order to serve the forum state.287
In asserting jurisdiction, the court began its discussion of the stream of
commerce theory by using the language of World-Wide Volkswagen.288 The
minimum contacts prong is satisfied as long as the "non-resident defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state... 'purposeful availment' must be such that the defendant should reasonably

279. See Vandelune, 148 F.3d at 948.
280. See id The court held that the fact the Switch monitors were distributed through its affiliate with its
distinctive "Owl" logo and decal on each device, and employees attended technical support meetings close to the
Iowa border also contributed to the conclusion that the contacts with the forum state were not "attenuated, random,
or fortuitous." Id.
281. See discussion infra Part II.D.2.
282. See Ham v. La Cienega Music Co., 4 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 1993)(following World-Wide Volkswagen
until its rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court); Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 864 F.2d 383,
386 (5th Cir. 1989)(gauging purposeful contacts by the stream of commerce standard established in World-Wide
Volkswagen sinceAsahidoes not provide any clear guidance on the issue); Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Co., 818 F.2d
370, 375 (5th Cir. 1987)(referring to the uncertainty in Asahi).
283. 9 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 1993).
284. See id. at 417. Ruston sued Donaldson for breach of contract, breach of warranty and strict products
liability over a contract between the two companies. Id.
285. See id. Corchran is a Minnesota corporation and conducts no business in Texas, the state where the suit
has been filed. Id.
286. See id.
287. See id. at 420-21.
288. See id. at 419.
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anticipate being haled into court in the forum state."2" 9 The Fifth Circuit interpreted
World-Wide Volkswagen liberally by holding that "mere foreseeability or awareness
[is] a constitutionally sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction if the defendant's
product made its way into the forum state while still in the stream of commerce."29
Using its liberal analysis, the court reasoned that Corchran "intentionally placed its
products into the stream of commerce by delivering them to a shipper destined for
delivery in Texas."2 9' Corchran knew that its products would end up in Texas.2 92
Corchran also should have anticipated being haled into court in Texas from its 211
contacts with Texas through its business relationships, making the exercise of
jurisdiction proper.'
In keeping with its own precedent, the Fifth Circuit established jurisdiction on
the basis of World-Wide Volkswagen, and disregarded the stream of commerce
"plus" theory of Justice O'Connor in Asahi.294 The Fifth Circuit rejected Asahi's
"splintered view" because it did not command a majority of the court or provide
clear guidance on the amount of contact required under the stream of commerce
theory.295 The Fifth Circuit explicitly chose to follow the stream of commerce
theory established in World-Wide Volkswagen because it was the last Supreme
Court decision to give clear guidance on the issue of minimum contacts in the
stream of commerce analysis.296
These three circuits which chose to follow the precedent in World-Wide
Volkswagen realized the limited application of Asahi.297 Asahi was first limited by
its facts because it involved two foreign parties.298 Asahi was next limited because
a majority of the Court did not decide how much contact was required under the
stream of commerce theory.299 While the other circuits are holding that they are not
choosing a test under Asahi, they are impliedly still following World-Wide
Volkswagen because they must use its language to define a purposeful contact under
the stream of commerce theory.300 The Seventh, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits are
explicitly calling it to the Supreme Court's attention thatAsahi did not change the
stream of commerce theory and World-Wide Volkswagen is still precedent.3 '

289. Ruston Gas,9 F.3d at 419 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). The Fifth Circuit follows

the Supreme Court's rationale in World- Wide Volkswagen thatitis enough for minimum contacts if a non-resident
defendant places their product into the stream of commerce with knowledge of its use in the forum state. Id.
290. See Ruston Gas, 9 F.3d at 419.

291. See id. at 420.
292. See id.
293. See id. at 420-21.
294. See id. at 420; see also supra note 282.
295. See id.
296. See Ruston Gas,9 F.3d at 420 (quoting Irving v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 864 F.2d 383,386 (5th
Cir. 1989)).
297. See discussion infra Part IILD.2.
298. See Asahi, 480 U.S. 114-15.
299. See id. at 112, 116-17.
300. See discussion infra Part IDL
301. See discussion infra Part DI.D.1-3.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The stream of commerce test was originally created to enable a state to
exercise jurisdiction over non-resident manufacturers who did not have direct
contact with that state.3°0 States sought to protect their citizens who were injured
by products of the manufacturers, and the stream of commerce test enabled states
to bring the manufacturers into court to enforce liability. 3 The Supreme Court in
World-Wide Volkswagen applied the stream of commerce test, holding that the
contact should be such that the defendant should reasonably foresee being haled
into court in the forum state." 4 When the Supreme Court decided Asahi, it was
slated as the case to help further clarify the amount of contact the defendant must
have with the forum state for the exercise of jurisdiction to be proper? °5 Instead,
Asahi further confused the issue. 6 by splitting the Court.30 7 Justice O'Connor's
four held that additional conduct on the part of the defendant is needed for the
exercise of jurisdiction to be proper. 30 ' However, Justice Brennan's four held that
as long as the product is placed into the stream of commerce, and the defendant
benefits from the sale of the product in the forum state, the exercise of jurisdiction
should be proper. 3 9 Neither group was able to raise or lower the amount of contact
the defendant must have with the forum state that was established in World-Wide
Volkswagen because neither had a majority.31 0
The confusion over the stream of commerce test continued into the circuit
courts, as evidenced by the split in the circuits in applying the analysis in product
liability suits. 31 The First Circuit chose Justice O'Connor's test in requiring
additional conduct by the defendant3 1 z while the Fourth Circuit reconciled WorldWide Volkswagen andAsahi into one test.313 Three of the circuits chose to apply the
facts in the record to all of the tests in Asahi.314 These circuits simply ensure that
enough facts exist so that the exercise of jurisdiction under any analysis is
appropriate. 3 5 Even though only three of the circuit courts explicitly chose to
continue applying World-Wide Volkswagen's precedent,1 6 most all the circuit
courts impliedly follow World-Wide Volkswagen's standard by employing its

302. See Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assoc., Inc, 149 F.3d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 1998).

303. See id.
304. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
305. See Packerware Corp. v. B & R Plastic, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1079 (D. Kan. 1998).

306. See id.
307. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112, 116-17.
308. See id. at 112.

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

See id. at 116-17.
See id. at 112-17.
See discussion infra Part I3.
See Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods. Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 682-83 (1st Cir. 1992).
See Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945 (4th Cir. 1994).
See discussion infra Part IILA.1-3.
See discussion infra Part JILA.1-3.
See discussion infra Part ILD.1-3.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1999

27

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 35 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 12

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.35:705

language. 7 Because Asahi did not provide any guidance on how to define a
purposeful contact under the stream of commerce test, World-Wide Volkswagen is
still the most logical answer.318 World-Wide Volkswagen is the only court to define
purposeful contact with majority support, and it is still precedent.31 1 World-Wide
Volkswagen's stream of commerce test which held that it is not unreasonable to
subject a defendant to suit in the forum state "if the sale of a product... arises from
the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the
market °for its product in other States" remains the standard for product liability
32
suits.
Because World-Wide Volkswagen is still the standard for the stream of
commerce analysis, non-resident defendants and their attorneys must be wary that
Asahi did not raise the amount of conduct needed to find the exercise of personal
jurisdiction proper. Even in the circuit courts claiming to be following Asahi by
applying the facts in the record to all the Asahi analyses, World-Wide Volkswagen
language is still employed to describe stream of commerce standard. 31 Courts still
examine whether the defendant has shown any intent to serve the forum state either
directly or indirectly in order to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.322
Because of all the different tests being employed by the circuit courts, the
Supreme Court must revisit the issue of personal jurisdiction under the stream of
commerce theory. In Asahi, the Court sought to clarify the amount of contact
required to establish jurisdiction when a non-resident manufacturer places its
product into the stream of commerce. 32 3 The court failed in its goal since four
sought to raise the bar while another four sought to lower the bar and neither
succeeded. 324 The circuit split is evidence of the confusion in applying the stream
of commerce analysis not only in product liability suits, but in any case in which a
purposeful contact analysis is used. 31 Currently, World-Wide Volkswagen is the
standard for the stream of commerce test because most all of the circuits employ its
language to define the test,32 6 andAsahi did not change the standard with a majority
of the Court.327 World-Wide Volkswagen therefore, stands as the precedent until the
Supreme Court unifies the circuits and changes the standard.
Kristin R. Baker

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

See discussion infra Part 111
See discussion infra Part ILB.
See supra notes 1-8, and accompanying text.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
See discussion infra Part ilL
See discussion infra Part IL
480 U.S. at 105.
See id. at 112, 116-17.
See discussion infra Part HIL
See discussion infra Part ilL
See discussion infra Part IlL
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